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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2648  
________________
TYRONE T. MCRAE; 
NAJI SPORTSWEAR INC.
v.
JAMES TODD SMITH; CHARLES FISHER; FUBU 
GTFM INC; NAJEE INC.; J. ALEXANDER MARTIN
Tyrone T. McRae,
Appellant
                                                                                         
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Jersey   
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-05382)
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 2, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES 
(Filed:    November 8, 2005)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Tyrone T. McRae, a New Jersey resident, and NAJI Sportswear
2submitted an in forma pauperis civil complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), against James Todd
Smith, Charles Fisher, Najee Inc., J. Alexander Martin, FUBU The Collection, and
GTFM, Inc.  In an order entered on December 29, 2003, the District Court dismissed the
complaint with respect to the corporation because corporations may appear in federal
courts only through licensed counsel.  Rowland v. Calif. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s
Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993).  The court further concluded that all of
McRae’s claims derived from a trademark owned by the corporation, and that he had no
claims distinct from the corporation’s claims.  
McRae was granted leave to amend to articulate claims distinct from those based
upon the corporation’s trademark, if possible.  He then filed an amended complaint with
essentially the same allegations and paid the filing fee.  Defendants J. Alexander Martin,
FUBU The Collection LLC, and GTFM, Inc., a New York corporation, answered the
complaint and asserted counterclaims, and later moved for summary judgment or to
dismiss the complaint.  In an order entered on March 21, 2005, the District Court granted
summary judgment to the above defendants, and dismissed the amended complaint in its
entirety. 
After the answering defendants indicated their wish to withdraw their
counterclaims, the District Court, in an order entered on April 1, 2005, dismissed them
without prejudice.  Meanwhile, McRae moved for reconsideration, arguing that his
corporation had ceased to exist as of March 3, 1998, and he thus could pursue its
      The appellees have argued that the appeal is untimely under Federal Rule of1
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A).  The argument lacks merit.  The notice of appeal was
filed on April 20, 2005, and thus within 30 days of the order entered on March 21, 2005. 
More to the point, it was filed within 30 days of the orders disposing of the counterclaims
and motions for reconsideration and reargument.  This Court may hear appeals only from
final orders of the district court.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The order must end the litigation as
to all claims and all parties.  Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963).  The March
21 order was not appealable, and the time for appealing did not begin to run, until the
litigation was ended as to the counterclaims and the motions for reconsideration.
      There was no evidence whatever that either McRae or his corporation had any2
common law or commercial interests in the FUBU mark.
3
trademark claims.  Orders denying McRae’s requests for reconsideration and reargument
were entered on April 11 and 12, 2005.  McRae appeals.
We will affirm.   McRae alleged trademark infringement, unfair competition, and1
false designation of origin claims with regard to two trademarks, NAJI and FUBU.  He
contended that the defendants infringed on the NAJI mark by manufacturing apparel with
the term NAJEE, and by obtaining and using the trademark FUBU, an acronym for “For
U By Us.”  The District Court concluded, however, and, after carefully reviewing the
record, we agree, that McRae suffered no competitive injury independent of his
corporation.  It is undisputed that the mark, the name NAJI, is held by McRae’s
corporation, Ikhanaten Armor, Inc., a Delaware corporation.  Although McRae alleged
that he licenses the NAJI mark to his corporation, a copy of the trademark itself indicates
that the corporation is the registered owner.
The District Court correctly held that Ikhanaten Armor, Inc. is the real party in
interest.  McRae has no interests in the litigation separate from the corporation,  and,2
4although that fact prevents him from bringing this pro se lawsuit, importantly, it also
shields him from personal liability should a third party sue the corporation.  Because
Ikhanaten Armor, Inc. is a corporation and the real party in interest, it remains only to be
said that, as the District Court properly held, McRae may not represent it pro se.  See
Rowland, 506 U.S. at 202.  
Naji Sportswear is the sole proprietorship that remained after the corporation
ceased to exist.  However, under both Delaware, 8 Del. Code § 278 (West 2001), and
New York, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1003 (McKinney 2003), law, a dissolved corporation
may continue to exist for the purpose of winding up its affairs, including bringing and
defending lawsuits (in federal court through licensed counsel).
Defendants Smith, Fisher, and Najee Inc. never entered an appearance or otherwise
appeared in the case.  Because the complaint and amended complaint cannot proceed as a
threshold matter, default judgment as to the defendants who did not answer or appear is
unavailable.  The District Court’s disposition of matters is applicable to them as well. 
We will affirm the orders of the District Court dismissing the complaint and
amended complaint and denying the motions for reconsideration.  McRae’s motion for
expedited summary action is denied.
